Enjoining  Res Judicata: The Federal-State Relationship and Conclusiveness of Settlements in Stockholders\u27 Derivative Suits by unknown
"ENJOINING" RES JUDICATA: THE FEDERAL-STATE
RELATIONSHIP AND CONCLUSIVENESS OF
SETTLEMENTS IN STOCKHOLDERS'
DERIVATIVE SUITS*
THE only remedy shareholders have for breach of fiduciary duty by the
officers of a corporation is the stockholder's derivative suit.' Subject to pro-
cedural limitations, 2 any shareholder may initiate such a suit, but the cause of
action belongs solely to the corporation 3 and individual shareholders can sue
only when the corporation itself refuses to do so. 4 After a derivative action
has been begun by one group of stockholders, other groups may not only in-
tervene in the initial suit , but may also bring separate derivative actions based
on the same facts in other courts. 6 Final judgment in one suit operates as res
*Breswick v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), appeal dismissed without
opinion, Civil No. 23661, 2d Cir., Jan. 23, 1956.
1. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 4 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ; Berlack, Stockholders' Suits: A
Possible Substitute, 35 MICH. L. REV. 597 (1937). Theoretically, shareholders also can
vote to remove the directors from office, but this remedy has little practical utility. See
Hornstein, The Future of Corporate Control, 63 HARv. L. REv. 476 (1950) ; Pierce, Security
for Expenses in Stockholder's Derivative Actions, in CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLA-
TION 388, 390 (1952).
2. The plaintiff in such an action must be a stockholder in fact at the time the suit
is brought. Barnett v. Ground, 304 Mo. 593, 605, 263 S.W. 836, 839 (1924) ; Isaacs v.
'Milwaukee Chair Co., 229 Wis. 184, 282 N.W. 1 (1938). Some jurisdictions require
in addition a showing that plaintiff was a stockholder at the time of the alleged breach of
duty. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b); N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 61. An additional limita-
tion imposed in an increasing number of jurisdictions is a requirement that stockholder-
plaintiffs possessing less than a certain amount of the shares of the corporation must secure
defendants against all expenses incurred in the successful defense of any cause of action
pleaded. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 834 (1955) ; N.J. Rav. STAT. § 14:3-15 (Supp. 1954);
N.Y. GLx. CorP. LAW § 61b; PA. STAT. ANN. it. 12, § 1322 (Purdon 1954). These
statutes are applicable as well to actions in federal courts when jurisdiction is based on
diversity of citizenship. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
3. Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 15, 99 N.E. 138, 141 (1912);
BALLANTIIE, CORPORATIONS 333 (2d ed. 1946) (collecting cases). All sums recovered there-
fore inure to the corporation. 13 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 6028
(perm. ed. 1943) ; STEVENS, CORPORATIONS 799 (2d ed. 1949). If a shareholder is successful
he is entitled to reimbursement for all proper expenditures made in the prosecution of
the suit, including counsel fees. Pergament v. Frazer, 132 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Mich. 1954) ;
Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 CoLum. L. REv. 784, 788
(1939).
4. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 462 (1881); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b); BALLANTINE,
CoRPORATiONS 345 (2d ed. 1946). See Pierce, supra note 1, at 388 for the rationale under-
lying this rule.
5. Leave to intervene is generally granted, but will be denied if the equities of the
situation require. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919); White v. British
Type Investors, Inc., 130 N.J. Eq. 157, 21 A.2d 681 (Ch. 1941); Dresdner v. Goldman
Sachs Trading Corp., 240 App. Div. 242, 269 N.Y. Supp. 360 (2d Dep't 1934).
6. Dana v. Morgan, 232 Fed. 85 (2d Cir. 1916) ; Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 99 N.Y.
:185, 194, 1 N.E. 663, 668 (1885). Contra, Goodbody v. Delaney, 80 N.J. Eq. 417, 83
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judicata in all suits, however, and bars further litigation on the underlying
causes of action. Thus, when a number of cases involving the same alleged
wrongs are pending, defendants can attempt to litigate the basic issues in the
suit which appears most favorable to them by employing dilatory tactics in the
other actions.
Judicial approval of a stipulation of settlement also operates as res judicata
in all other suits.8 A settlement can be presented for approval even though it
is accepted by only one plaintiff-shareholder. 9 Hearings on the propriety of
the settlement must be held. 10 Objecting shareholders can intervene and are
entitled to produce evidence and witnesses and to cross-examine all witnesses
who appear for the proponents of the settlement." Moreover, at least under
Atl. 988 (Ch. 1912) (shareholders may intervene but may not bring separate plenary
action). A derivative suit is in personam, and thus can be litigated whenever the requisite
jurisdiction over parties and subject matter is present. 13 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS §§ 5986-93 (perm. ed. 1943). It is not uncommon to have a number of
suits pending against the same parties involving the same alleged wrongs.
7. Ratner v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 6 F.R.D. 618, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) ; Dresdner
v. Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., 240 App. Div. 242, 244, 269 N.Y. Supp. 360, 363 (2d
Dep't 1934). This is true for two reasons: the suit is a "true class action," and judg-
ment in such an action is binding on all members of the class. Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d
64 (2d Cir. 1954) ; 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE I'f 23.08, 23.11 (2d ed. 1948). Also, since
the "cause of action" adjudicated in a derivative suit is that of the corporation, once
it has had its day in court subsequent litigation by its representatives is barred. Dana v.
Morgan, 219 Fed. 313, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1914), aff'd, 232 Fed. 85 (2d Cir. 1916); Potter
v. Walker, 276 N.Y. 15, 27, 11 N.E.2d 335, 337 (1937); McLaughlin, The Mystery of
the Representative Suit, 26 GEo. L.J. 878 (1938).
8. Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Dana v. Morgan, 232 Fed. 85 (2d Cir.
1916); Milvy v. Sperry Corp., 36 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
9. Naitove v. Morrow, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 2, 1940, p. 1386, col. 4, aff'd, 260 App. Div.
1017, 24 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1st Dep't 1940), discussed in WOOD, SuRVEY AND REPORT 70-72
(1944), and Hornstein, Problems of Procedure in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 42
CoLum. L. REv. 574, 590 (1942). If a new board of directors negotiates a settlement with
the wrongdoers, the court will consider the settlement even though all litigating share-
holders refuse to accept it. Denicke v. Anglo California Nat'l Bank, 45 F. Supp. 524 (N.D.
Cal. 1942), aff'd, 141 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., 28 Del. Ch. 343,
43 A.2d 721 (Ch. 1945) ; Bysheim v. Miranda, 44 N.Y.S.2d 15 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) ; Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1942) (failure
to hold full hearings on all salient facts constitutes abuse of trial court's discretion).
Under New York law such procedure is not mandatory before a derivative action will be
dismissed. Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., 240 App. Div. 242, 269 N.Y.
Supp. 360 (2d Dep't 1934). However, a judgment entered on discontinuance of a derivative
suit without such hearing is not a judgment "on the merits" and hence is not effective as
res judicata. Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
Therefore, the practice of hearings and court approval of settlements has developed inde-
pendent of statute. See, e.g., Bysheim v. Miranda, 44 N.Y.S.2d 15 (Sup. Ct. 1943) ; Beeber
v. Empire Power Corp., 31 N.Y.S.2d 914 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Hornstein, Problems of Pra-
cedure in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 42 CoLum. L. REv. 574, 586-90 (1942).
11. Letter from Robert J. Fitzsimmons, Esq., referee in Zenn v. Anzalone, the New
York court proceeding considering the Alleghany derivative action settlement, to the




New York and federal practice, notice of the compromise and time of hearing
is given to all stockholders.' 2 The settlement will be approved, however, un-
less the court finds that in view of the "probabilities of victory or defeat," the
settlement is "unfair or unreasonable to the corporation."'1 3 Objecting share-
holders may appeal judicial approval of the settlement, 14 but absent fraud or
collusion the final judgment is binding on the corporation and all its stock-
holders.',
To the conditions necessary to give conclusive effect to a settlement decree,
the recent case of Breswick v. Briggs 16 added the requirement that all actively
litigating shareholders must participate in negotiation of the settlement. A
number of derivative suits had been initiated against the directors of Alleghany
Corporation. 17 By June 1955, all actions except Breswick, and three other
cases filed in federal court,'8 had been consolidated under one general counsel.
12. In federal courts, notice is mandatory. FED. R. Civ. P. 2 3 (c). In New York, notice
was given in the first case holding that a stockholder's judgment based on settlement was
effective as res judicata. Gerith Realty Co. v. Normandie Nat'l Securities Corp., 154 Misc.
615, 276 N.Y. Supp. 655 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 266 N.Y. 525 (1934). Subsequent litigants
have followed this procedure, even though it has apparently never been held to be man-
datory. BALLANTINE, CORORATrONS 364 (2d ed. 1946); Hornstein, Problems of Pro-
cedure in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 574, 588 (1942). See also
Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., 28 Del. Ch. 342, 43 A.2d 721 (Ch. 1945) (court practice is to
require notice).
13. The complete formula is: "[T]he court must weigh the probabilities and possi-
bilities of victory or defeat as indicated by the legal and factual situation presented. If
,uch considerations lead to the conclusion that the settlement ... is not unfair or unreason-
able to the corporation . . . . then the action of the plaintiffs in compromising the suit
hould be approved." Neuberger v. Barrett, N.Y. Sup. Ct., June 25, 1942 (unpublished
opinion), quoted in Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 490, 493 (S.D.N.Y.
1042), and Bysheim v. Miranda, 44 N.Y.S.2d 15, 23 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
14. Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1942); Posen v. Cowdin, 267 App. Div.
158, 44 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1st Dep't 1943) ; 3 MoomE, FEDEAL PRACriCE fr 23.24(5) (2d ed.
1948).
15. Gerith Realty Co. v. Normandie Nat'l Securities Corp., 154 Misc. 615, 276 N.Y.
Supp. 655 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 266 N.Y. 525 (1934) ; cases cited note 8, supra; McLaugh-
lin, Capacity of Plaintiff-Stockholder to Terminate a Stockholder's Suit, 46 YALE L.J.
421, 430 (1936).
16. 135 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), appeal dismissed without opinion, Civil No.
23661, 2d Cir., Jan. 23,1956.
17. The first of these actions was begun in April 1954. Memorandum for Defendants,
p. 4, Breswick v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). As of February 1955, when
the Bres-zick action was filed, a total of eighteen tuits had been brought in the New
York and federal courts, Statement by Robert Young, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1955, p. 51,
col. 6. All these cases primarily concern Alleghany's relinquishment of its control of
the Cheapeake & Ohio Railroad and its part in the election of the "Alleghany-Young-
IKirby" slate to the board of the New York Central Railroad. Memorandum for Defend-
ants, p. 3, Breswick v. Briggs, supra.
18. Memorandum for Defendants, p. 3, Breswick v. Briggs, supra note 17. Still
another derivative suit, Eisenberg v. Briggs, was begun in the district court for the Southern
District of New York on August 9, 1955, and remains unconsolidated. Record, p. 72,
Breswick v. Briggs, supra.
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Defendants had moved in May to consolidate these remaining suits under the
general counsel, but hearings on the motion were delayed until late August at
the request of counsel for Breswick.' 9 Before that time, however, the defen-
dant-directors had announced the negotiation of a settlement with the general
counsel20 and the submission of the settlement to the New York Supreme
Court for approval.2 1 In federal court the Breswick plaintiffs, claiming no
knowledge of the negotiations and no opportunity to enter them,2 2 moved for
an injunction staying state court consideration of the agreement on grounds of
collusion.
2 3
The federal district court found that although the allegations of collusion
had not been established,24 the conduct of the defendants in negotiating the
compromise without consulting the active Breswick plaintiffs was inequitable,
and that the defendants should not be permitted to profit by it.2 5 The court
19. Record, p. 51, Breswick v. Briggs, supra note 18.
20. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1955, p. 31, col. 6. The terms of the settlement are:
(1) payment by the defendants to Alleghany of $700,000; (2) an agreement by certain
defendants to protect the corporation from loss on its investment in 600,000 shares of
New York Central Stock, and to ensure it a 4y% return on its investment; and (3) a
similar guarantee for all other joint ventures in which the corporation participates
with certain of the defendants. Id., p. 35, col. 1.
21. Breswick v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The settlement was
referred to a referee who held the initial hearing on the proposal in September 1955.
22. The defendants justified the exclusion of plaintiffs' counsel from settlement nego-
tiations on the grounds that the Breswick action was only a step in the plaintiffs' battle for
control of Alleghany, and alleged that plaintiffs would not be willing to compromise for
any amount. Supplemental Brief for Defendants, p. 21, Breswick v. Briggs, supra note 21.
23. The plaintiffs also moved for summary judgment on five of the seven counts
alleged in their complaint. Defendants moved to consolidate this action with all others
and to designate the general counsel as general counsel in these suits also. Breswick v.
Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The collusion charge was based on the
allegation that the lawyer for the defendant corporation was closely associated with the
firm that represented the defendant directors. Id. at 403. The motion for summary judg-
ment was denied by the court, id. at 400-03, while consolidation was refused without
prejudice to its renewal after settlement proceedings had terminated, id. at 406-07.
24. Id. at 403.
25. Ibid. The court referred to the dominant role of the plaintiffs in establishing
one of the bases of liability common to all the suits. Plaintiffs had based their derivative
action on the proposition that during the period in question Alleghany had been subject
to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and that the defendants
had acted wrongfully in registering the corporation with the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission rather than with the former tribunal. The federal court had refused to rule on
this point within the derivative suit context. Breswick v. Briggs, 130 F. Supp. 953 (S.D.
N.Y. 1955). The plaintiffs then intervened in hearings before the ICC on the same point,
and, after the ICC decided against their contention, appealed that decision. In Breswick
v. United States, CCH FED. SEc. L. RtP'. 11 90,737 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1955), a three-
judge district court held that Alleghany had been subject to the SEC and that a preferred
stock issuance under ICC authority was null and void. However, the court ruled that the
corporation had come under SEC control sometime between May 21, 1954 and "at the
very latest," 'May 24, 1955, which period is subsequent to many of the transactions which
were alleged to have violated the Investment Company Act. Ibid.
[Vol. 65
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further held that intervention by the plaintiffs in a new forum on the limited
issue of the fairness of the settlement was not an adequate remedy.26 It con-
ceded that a federal injunction staying proceedings in the state court would
probably be prohibited by section 2283 of the Judicial Code.2 7 But the court
held that section 2283 did not prevent federal courts from enjoining a defen-
dant from fully utilizing a state court judgment where its enforcement would
be inequitable.2 s It therefore enjoined defendants from pleading as a defense
in the federal court any state court judgment approving a settlement "not
negotiated with plaintiffs or their counsel."
2 9 On appeal, the Second Circuit
refused to pass upon the injunction, dismissing defendants' appeal per curiam
on the ground that the order was "interlocutory." 0
It is doubtful whether federal courts have the power to grant such relief. The
purpose of section 2283 is to prevent federal courts from interfering with state
court proceedings. In view of the restrictive interpretation currently given sec-
tion 2283 by the Supreme Court,31 the Breswick court could not have enjoined
the state court proceedings. 32 It is true that several cases held that the pre-
decessor of 2283 did not bar federal injunctions against the enforcement of
inequitable state court judgments.33 These cases reasoned that injunctive re-
lief was permissible because the state court proceedings had terminated, and
hence would not be interrupted by issuance of the injunction, 34 or because the
26. Breswick v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
27. Id. at 405. Section 2283 provides: "A court of the United States may not grant
an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act
of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1952).
28. Breswick v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
29. Id. at 406. It has been held that this injunction "was intended to benefit the
Breswick plaintiffs only" and was not issued "on behalf of all stockholders." Breswick v.
Briggs, Civil No. 98-371, S.D.N.Y., Nov. 10, 1955 (as yet unreported).
30. Briggs v. Breswick, Civil No. 23661, 2d Cir., Jan. 23, 1956 (unreported).
31. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 518 (1954):
"The prohibition of § 2283 is but continuing evidence of confidence in the state courts, rein-
forced by a desire to avoid direct conflicts between state and federal courts." See Toucey
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941); Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306
U.S. 375 (1939); MOORE, COMMEN'TARY ON THE JUDICIAL CODE 395-415 (1949).
32. Feldman v. Pennroad Corp., 60 F. Supp. 716, 718 (D. Del. 1945), aff'd, 155 F.2d
773 (3d Cir. 1946) ; cf. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922) ; Essanay Film
Co. v. Kane, 258 U.S. 358 (1922) ; H. J. Heinz Co. v. Owens, 189 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1951).
33. Wells Fargo and Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1920) (evidence inadmissible in
state court) ; Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915) (void judgment) ; Marshall v.
Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891) (fraud); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Tompa, 51 F.2d 1032
(2d Cir. 1931) (evidence inadmissible in state court) ; National Surety Co. v. State Bank,
120 Fed. 593 (8th Cir. 1903) (accident or mistake).
Section 2283 in 1948 replaced § 265 of the Judicial Code of 1911, which read: "The writ
of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings
in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any
law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." Act of March 3, 1911, c. 231, § 265, 36 STAT.
1162. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1952).
34. Simon v. Southern Ry., supra note 33; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Tompa, supra
note 33; see Essanay Film Mfg. Co. v. Kane, 258 U.S. 358 (1922).
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injunction coerced the parties rather than the courts.3r But while the Supreme
Court has never overruled these cases, it has rejected their reasoning 36 and
expressed doubt as to their validity.37 A persuasive argument has been made
that neither 2283 nor the Supreme Court cases construing it forbid federal
courts to enjoin enforcement of judgments after state court proceedings have
terminated.38 Where state courts would entertain an equitable direct attack on
a judgment, it is argued, federal courts should be able to do so as well, and
2283 should be interpreted accordingly. 39 But even this argument is unavail-
ing in the Breswick situation, since there the state court proceedings had not
yet terminated. Certainly the injunction issued by the district court nullified
defendants' efforts in the state court almost as effectively as would the injunc-
tion against state court proceedings which is literally proscribed by 2283. A
judgment based upon settlement has value to a defendant only to the extent
that it is effective as res judicata. Where other plaintiffs remain to continue
a derivative suit on identical grounds, as in Breswick, a judgment which is not
effective against all plaintiffs is substantially worthless.
Even if 2283 were inapplicable, the substantive grounds for the district court's
ruling are obscure. Thus it would seem that, since the court had jurisdiction
only because of diversity of citizenship, it could grant relief only where au-
thorized by the applicable state law.40 Under New York law, equitable relief
35. Wells Fargo and Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1920); Marshall v. Holmes, 141
U.S. 589 (1891) ; National Surety Co. v. State Bank, 120 Fed. 593 (8th Cir. 1903).
36. The first ground, note 34 supra and accompanying text, was rejected in Hill v.
Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403 (1935) : "It [the term "proceedings in any court of a State"]
includes all steps taken or which may be taken in the state court or by its officers from
the institution to the close of final process." The second reason, note 35 supra and accom-
panying text, was repudiated in Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309
U.S. 4, 9 (1939) : "That the injunction was a restraint of the parties and was not formally
directed against the state court itself is immaterial." The reasoning of Oklahoma had
been stated as early as 1849, but had apparently been ignored during the period of judicial
hostility to § 265. See Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) *:612, *624-25 (1849).
37. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 136 (1941) (foundation of thesc
cases is "very doubtful").
38. See MooRE, COMMENTARY ON THE JUDICIAL CODE 395-415 (1949).
39. Id. at 414. There is serious doubt that the Supreme Court would adhere to this
interpretation, in view of the restrictive construction of § 2283 set forth in Amalgamatcd
Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511 (1954).
"Equitable direct attack" refers here to an independent action in equity or motion in
a subsequent action to obtain relief from an admittedly valid judgment, on the grounds
that certain extrinsic factors render full enjoyment of its benefits by the holder contrary
to recognized principles of equity. This form of attack is often characterized as "collateral
attack." See Griffith v. Bank, 147 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1945). However, that term should
be limited to proceedings in which a declaration is sought that the judgment itself is void,
and which require no showing of greater equity in favor of the challenging party. See 7
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 60.41(2) (2d ed. 1955).
40. It seems clear that Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), requircs that the
federal court base its decision to grant or withhold relief on the law of the statc of judg-
ment, where the court is exercising diversity jurisdiction and is sitting in that state, whether
"equitable" or "legal" relief is demanded. See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947) ;
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from a judgment is granted only where "virtual fraud" is established, and
where the circumstances which make enforcement of the judgment inequitable
could not have been urged as grounds for relief in the original action.41 But in
Brcswick, the court specifically rejected plaintiff's charges of collusion, the
only conduct alleged which could be subsumed under the heading of fraud.
42
And even if failure to notify active plaintiffs of the settlement negotiations were
considered to amount to fraud, this issue could have been raised at the settle-
ment hearings.43 The court apparently was cognizant of the limitations on
direct attack in equity imposed by New York law, but believed that its use of
the injunction device brought into play some general federal equity power. The
cases it cited in support of its ruling were, however, pre-Erie 44 decisions
based on "federal" principles of equity never adopted in New York.
4 5
Perhaps the best argument against the applicability of section 2283 to the
decision is suggested by the Second Circuit's laconic dismissal of the appeal as
"interlocutory." Since all "injunctions" are appealable, whether "interlocu-
tory" or not,4 6 the dismissal of the appeal apparently holds that the district
court's order was not in reality an injunction.47 Because the purported injunc-
tion had reference to a state court judgment which might never materialize,
and thus was hypothetical, the circuit court may have construed the order as
a mere announcement by the district court of its intention not to uphold a plea
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) ; Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304
U.S. 202 (1938). In all other situations, the full faith and credit clause would compel the
same result. 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrICE ff 60.37(3) (2d ed. 1955).
41. 775 Seventh Ave. Corp. v. Carroll, 266 N.Y. 155, 194 N.E. 68 (1935) (virtual
fraud must be shown) ; Fuhrmann v. Fanroth, 254 N.Y. 479, 173 N.E. 685 (1930) (must
he shown in original action if known at that time) ; Harris v. Interstate Training Service,
140 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (same); Finestone v. Frostholm, 69 N.Y.S.2d 556 (N.Y.
Munic. Ct. 1947) (rule applies to consent judgments as well).
42. See text at note 24 supra.
43. The Breswich decision was submitted to the New York Supreme Court in support
of a motion to vacate the order referring the settlement to a referee on the ground that
it had been negotiated in an inequitable manner. The motion was denied, and this decision
was affirmed per curiam by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. The Appellate
Division stated that the exclusion of these plaintiffs was improper only if it had an adverse
effect on the terms of the settlement, and this issue should properly be raised at the
hearings on the settlement. Zenn v. Anzalone, 146 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1st Dept. 1955).
44. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
45. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1952).
47. The correctness of the Second Circuit's decision is at least dubious. See MooRE, CoM-
MENTARY ON THE JUDICIAL CODE ff 0.03 (52) (1949) ; 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 54.07
(2d ed. 1953). Had the plaintiff asked for an injunction of the type granted by the district
court, an order denying the injunction but giving an "advisory opinion" to the same effect
would have been grounds for an appeal within the clear mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1952).
Also, the circuit court did not order the injunction itself to be vacated and presumably it is
still in effect. Theoretically, therefore, the defendants can be held in contempt of court if
they amend their answer to include a judgment based on the settlement. However, this
result can be avoided by asking leave of the court to amend. And denial of such permission
by the court would probably be reversible error.
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of res judicata based on a state court judgment, if and when such a plea should
be entered. And if the order was not an injunction for purposes of appeal, it
could scarcely be an injunction forbidden by 2283. However, while the sug-
gested rationale avoids 2283, it reinforces the conclusion that the decision was
erroneous. The res judicata effect of a state court judgment is determined by
the applicable state law. 48 And the New York decisions establish clearly that a
plea of res judicata cannot be denied on the grounds advanced in Dreswick.40
Indeed, the court's realization that it could not deny the plea probably dictated
its adoption of the injunction device.
Wholly apart from considerations of procedure and choice of law, the added
protection which the Breswick rule would give to litigating shareholders does
not seem to justify its use. Breswick would deny res judicata effect to a settle-
ment unless all litigating shareholders either had participated in the negotiations
or had been consolidated under a general counsel. But settlement negotiations
are often informal and sporadic, and the court did not attempt to determine the
difficult questions of when notification must be given and what would constitute
"participation." And since a settlement agreed to by any plaintiff-shareholder
can be submitted to the court and approved over the objections even of a
majority of the active litigants,50 the only possible advantage of participation
is that a plaintiff displeased with the terms of the compromise can present his
views to the negotiating parties before the agreement is submitted to the court.
But if others choose to submit the settlement without his approval, and the
court finds the compromise is "not unfair or unreasonable," it will still be
approved. Ioreover, identical considerations vitiate the effectiveness of the
requirement that defendants consolidate all actions: the settlement need only
be agreed to by one of the consolidated plaintiffs in order to be submitted to
the court? 1 Furthermore, since many state and federal courts may have con-
current jurisdiction, consolidation will often be difficult and in some cases im-
possible.
5 2
48. National Lead Co. v. Nulsen, 131 F.2d 51, 56 (8th Cir. 1942) ; Illinois Cent. R.R.
v. Moore, 112 F.2d 959, 966 (5th Cir. 1940) ; cases cited at note 40 szpra.
49. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
50. See note 9 supra.
51. The general counsel has no greater power or right to negotiate a settlement or
to block the submission of any settlement to the court for approval than does the attorney
for any other shareholder. Typically, the general counsel has powers to issue and re-
ceive all papers, to initiate and conduct all pretrial examinations, and to have charge of the
conduct of the trial. See Order of Consolidation, Zenn v. Anzalone, Civil No. 92-205,
S.D.N.Y., May 18, 1954, pp. 4-5 (unreported order) (page citations are from typewritten
copy on file in Yale Law Library), stating explicitly that consolidation is ordered "with-
out prejudice" to any rights which any plaintiff might have if there were no consolidation.
See also Greenberg v. Giannini, 50 F. Supp. 33, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 140 F.2d 550
(2d Cir. 1944); 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE fI 42.02 (2d ed. 1951).
52. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. Two courts, with similar actions before
them, might each refuse to order consolidation unless the action were to be decided in its
own forum. If this occurred, there could be no binding determination of venue unless both
were in the same judicial hierarchy. Under present law, both cases would proceed until
[Vol. 65
NOTES
To disapprove Breswick is not to say that results reached in the absence of
the new rule it creates are completely satisfactory. Plainly, existing settlement
procedure does not fully protect the interests of all stockholder-plaintiffs.
Shareholders litigating elsewhere are forced to abandon their own suits tem-
porarily and transfer their attention to a new case and forum if they are dis-
pleased with the compromise. In the hearings the important procedural weapons
of pretrial examination and subpoenaing of corporate records are not avail-
able.5' And since "probability of victory or defeat" is an extremely speculative
standard,54 only those settlements blatantly advantageous to defendants fail to
meet the judicial test of fairnessY5 To upset a compromise, objectors must
show either that the settlement was tainted by fraud or collusion or that the
terms of the agreement were unduly generous. 0 Proving fraud or collusion
is notoriously difficult, and absent such proof the burden the objector carries is
.'probably unsustainable.15 7
Despite these inequities, it is unlikely that many jurisdictions will make
settlement of derivative actions substantially more difficult than it now is.
Compromise of litigation is generally encouraged in order to reduce adminis-
trative burden and expense to courts and litigants.53 It is true that a plaintiff
who compromises a derivative suit terminates the rights of others as well as
his own; and for this reason many jurisdictions require court approval of settle-
one was adjudicated, whereupon the other suit would be foreclosed. See note 7 supra and
accompanying text. If the burden of consolidation were shifted, the defendants might be
forced to litigate the same matters twice whenever this problem arose. Such an occurrence
would undoubtedly be rare, but when it happened the resulting impasse would be complete.
53. Pretrial examination is denied because the issues to be determined in the hearings
are decnid to be too limited. In some hearings objecting stockholders have been permitted
to sxe any records of the corporation which have been examined by counsel for other stock-
holder plaintiffs during the litigation, but these appear to be the only records to which they
have access. Letter from Robert J. Fitzsimmons, Esq., referee in Zenn v. Anzalone, to the
Yale Law Journal, Nov. 29, 1955, on file in Yale Law Library. See also Hornstein, The
Future of Corporate Control, 63 Hamv. L. REV. 476, 480 (1950) : "In stockholde" litigation
where corporate records and other evidence needed to prove improper conduct are often
within the control of the defendants, preliminary examination is particularly essential."
54. See note 13 supra.
55. Between 1932 and 1942, in New York state and federal courts, thirty-six settle-
ments were offered for court approval. Of these, only two were not approved. One of these
actions was subsequently litigated and resulted in a judgment for defendants. In the other,
a larger settlement resulted. WOOD, SuRVEY AND REPORT 42, 93 (1944). The approved
settlements averaged 3% of the amount demanded in the complaint. Id. at 7; Hornstein,
Legal Controls for Intra-Corporate Abuse, 41 COLUm. L. Ra.. 405, 426 (1941).
56. Fielding v. Allen, 99 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Bysheim v. Miranda, 44
N.Y.S.2d 15 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
57. Fielding v. Allen, supra note 56, at 141.
58. Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 330 (6th Cir. 1953); Hornstein, New
A.spects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 CoLum. L. REv. 1, 19 (1947) ; Keefe, Levy
& Donavan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327, 343 (1948); McLaughlin,
Capacity of Plaintiff-Shareholder to Terminate a Stockholder's Suit, 46 YALE L.J. 421,
426 (1936); Note, 54 -ARV. L. REV. 833 (1941).
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ments. 59 But it is also true that plaintiffs seldom have more than a trivial
financial interest in the recovery they seek on behalf of the corporation, c so
that extreme solicitude for the interests of nonassenting plaintiffs is seldom
warranted. Moreover, these suits are extremely burdensome to parties defen-
dant, and have often been the subject of abuse."' These considerations have
led courts to establish existing low standards for approval of settlements.
No pat formula is likely to solve the problems posed by settlement of deri-
vative suits. It would seem, however, that courts are not properly implement-
ing the aims of the rule requiring judicial supervision of settlqments when they
grant approval, over protest from active litigants, merely because a "reason-
able man" could have negotiated such an agreement. For the purpose of the
rule is not only to prevent fraud or collusion, but to ensure that compromise
will take place only where it serves the best interests of the corporation. 2
Improvement may lie in the direction of a more restrictive standard which will
require trial courts to take a more active role in safeguarding the interests of
nonassenting shareholders. But whatever the merits of a stricter standard, the
advisability of its adoption is a matter for each jurisdiction to determine for
itself. Dissatisfaction with existing procedure should not find expression through
the device of enjoining parties from enjoying the benefits of judgments validly
obtained in other jurisdictions.
59. See, e.g., note 10 supra. See also COLO. R. Civ. P. 23(c) ; N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:36-3;
PA. R. Civ. P. 2230(b) ; TEx. R. Civ. P. 42(c) ; Whitten v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 154
Pac. 312 (1915).
60. See, e.g., WOOD, op. cit. supra note 47, at 112, app. D.
61. See Berlack, Stockholders' Suits: A Possible Substitute, 35 Micn. L. REV. 597,
604-05; Pierce, Security for Expenses in Stockholder's Derivative Actions, in CwumENT
TRENDS ix STATE LEGisLATION 388, 394-95 (1952) ; Pound, Visitatorial Juri.sdictiou over
Corporations in Equity, 49 HA v. L. REv. 369, 395 (1936).
62. Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1942) ; Berger v. Dyson, 111 F. Supp.
533 (D.R.I. 1953) ; Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
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